



Chapter 2: Security Policies

DATABASE SECURITY



Overview

- what security policy is to be enforced by the system?
 - First question before designing a secure system
 - a set of rules that enforce security
 - mandatory security policies
 - policies that are “mandatory” in nature and are application independent
 - Bell and LaPadula
 - discretionary security policies
 - policies that are specified by who is responsible for the environment in which the system will operate
 - This chapter focuses on discretionary security policies





Overview

- Access control
 - most popular discretionary security policy
 - First studied for operating systems
 - Two first database systems that investigate it
 - System R and INGRES
- Other discretionary policies
 - administration policies
 - identification and authentication policies






Access-Control Policies

- first examined for operating systems
 - essential point: whether a process can be granted access to a file.
 - Access could be read access or write access
 - Write access could include access to modify, append, or delete.
- were transferred to database systems
 - various forms have been studied
 - Notable: role-based access-control policies
 - now implemented in several commercial systems

Access-Control Policies





Authorization Policies

- Users are granted access to data based on authorization rules
 - Positive Authorizations
 - John has read access to attribute Salary and write access to attribute Name in relation EMP.
 - Write access could include
 - Append
 - Modify
 - delete



Authorization Policies

- Users are granted access to data based on authorization rules
 - Negative Authorization
 - What if access to an object is not specified?
 - Implicit: authorization rule that is not specified is taken to be a negative authorization
 - Explicit: negative authorizations are explicitly specified.
 - Example: John does not have access to relation EMP or Jane does not have access to relation DEPT



Authorization Policies

- Users are granted access to data based on authorization rules
 - Conflict Resolutions
 - how do we resolve the conflicting rules?
 - a rule grants John read access to relation EMP
 - another rule does not grant John read access to the salary attribute in EMP.
 - Usually a system enforces the least privilege rule
 - John has access to EMP except for the salary values



Authorization Policies

- Users are granted access to data based on authorization rules
 - Strong and Weak Authorization
 - strong authorization: the rule holds regardless of conflicts.
 - weak authorizations: the rule does not hold in case of conflict
 - Example
 - John is granted access to EMP with a strong authorization rule
 - the rule where John is not granted access to salary attribute is a weak authorization
 - The strong authorization will hold



Authorization Policies

- Users are granted access to data based on authorization rules
 - Propagation of Authorization Rules
 - how do the rules get propagated?
 - John has read access to relation EMP
 - does it automatically mean that John has read access to every element in EMP?
 - Usually this is the case
 - unless we have a rule that prohibits automatic propagation of an authorization rule.



Authorization Policies

- Users are granted access to data based on authorization rules
 - Special Rules
 - Content-based rules
 - access is granted depending on the content of the data
 - John has read access to tuples only in DEPT D100.
 - Context-based rules
 - access is granted depending on the context in which the data is displayed
 - John does not have read access to names and salaries taken together, however, he can have access to individual names and salaries.
 - Event-based rules
 - after the election, John has access to all elements in relation EMP



Authorization Policies

- Users are granted access to data based on authorization rules
 - Consistency of Rules
 - do we have conflict resolution rules that will resolve the conflicts?
 - Completeness of Rules
 - Are all of the entities specified in access-control rules for a user?
 - what assumptions do we make about entities that do not have either positive or negative authorizations for a particular user or a class of users?



Authorization Policies

- Role-Based Access Control
 - Idea:
 - grant access to users depending on their roles and functions
 - Issues:
 - does access propagate upwards in the hierarchy ?
 - What about the downward propagation?
 - What about the multiple parents?



Administration Policies

- Specify who is to administer the data
 - keeping the data current
 - making sure the metadata is updated whenever the data is updated
 - ensuring recovery from failures
 - ...






Administration Policies

- Typically
 - DBA is responsible for updating
 - the metadata
 - the index
 - access methods
 - also ensuring that the access-control rules are properly enforced.
 - SSO may also have a role.
 - DBA and SSO may share the duties
 - security-related issues might be the responsibility of the SSO
 - data-related issues might be the responsibility of the DBA.



Administration Policies

- Other administration policies
 - assigning caretakers
 - Usually owners have control of the data that they create
 - owners may not be available to manage the data
 - Assign caretakers



Identification and Authentication

- By identification we mean
 - users must identify themselves with their user ID and password.
- Authentication means
 - the system must then match the user ID with the password to ensure that this is indeed the person
- We discuss identity management later



Auditing a Database System

- Databases are audited for multiple purposes
 - to keep track of
 - the number of queries posed
 - the number of updates made
 - the number of transactions executed
 - the number of times the secondary storage is accessed
 - Also for security purposes
 - have any of the access-control rules been bypassed by releasing information to the users?
 - Has the inference problem occurred?
 - Has privacy been violated?
 - Have there been unauthorized intrusions?



Views for Security

- DBA could form views and grant access to the views
 - views could be assigned security levels
 - have problems associated with them
 - view update problem

Views for Security

EMP

SS#	Ename	Salary	D#
1	John	20K	10
2	Paul	30K	20
3	Mary	40K	20
4	Jane	20K	20
5	Bill	20K	10
6	Larry	20K	10
1	Michelle	30K	20

V1: VIEW EMP (D# = 20)

SS#	Ename	Salary
2	Paul	30K
3	Mary	40K
4	Jane	20K
1	Michelle	30K

V2: VIEW EMP (D# = 10)

SS#	Ename	Salary
1	John	20K
5	Bill	20K
6	Larry	20K

Rules:
John has Read access to V1
John has Write access to V2

SQL Extensions for Security

- SQL has GRANT and REVOKE
 - GRANT JOHN EMP READ
 - REVOKE JOHN EMP READ
- also extended with more complex constraints

```
GRANT JOHN READ  
EMP.SALARY
```

```
GRANT JOHN READ  
EMP.NAME
```

```
NOT GRANT JOHN READ
```

```
Together (EMP.NAME, EMP.SALARY)
```

```
GRANT JOHN READ  
EMP
```

```
Where EMP.SALARY < 30K
```

These are not standards

Query Modification

- was first proposed in the INGRES
- The idea is to modify the query based on the constraints
 - John only has read access to tuples with
 - salary < 30K
 - employee is not in the Security department

```
Select * from EMP →  
Where EMP.Salary < 30K  
And EMP.D# = DEPT.D#  
And DEPT.Name is not Security
```