Chapter 2: Beyond Basic Static Analysis-x86 Disassembly

DATA SCIENCE IN SECURITY

Introduction

- To thoroughly understand a malicious program
 - we often need to go beyond basic static analysis
 - involves reverse engineering a program's assembly code
 - Indeed
 - disassembly and reverse engineering lie at the heart of deep static analysis of malware samples

Goal here is to introduce you engineering to apply it to malware data science

Disassembly Methods

Disassembly

- the process of translating malware's binary code into valid assembly language.
- is no easy feat
 - malware authors employ tricks to thwart reverse engineers.
- Perfect disassembly in the face of deliberate obfuscation is an unsolved problem
 - E.G. self-modifying code

Disassembly Methods

Disassembly

- we must use imperfect methods
 - Inear disassembly:
 - involves
 - identifying the contiguous sequence of bytes in the PE file
 - then decoding these bytes.
 - The key limitations :
 - it ignores subtleties about how instructions are decoded by the CPU
 - it doesn't account for the various obfuscations

Disassembly Methods

Disassembly

- There are other methods
 - we won't cover here
 - used by disassemblers such as IDA Pro.
 - simulate or reason about program execution
 - discover which instructions might reach as a result of a series of conditional branches
 - can be more accurate than linear disassembly
 - it's far more CPU intensive than linear disassembly
 - less suitable for data science purposes
 - disassembling thousands or even millions of programs.

- lowest-level human-readable programming language
- maps closely to the binary instruction format of CPU.
- A line is almost always equivalent to a single CPU instruction
- reading disassembled malware x86 code is easier than you might think


- malwares spend most of time calling into the operating system
 - by way of the DLLs
 - do most of the real work
 - modifying the system registry
 - moving and copying files
 - communicating via network protocols, and so on.
 - following malware assembly code often involves
 - understanding the ways in which function calls are made from assembly
 - understanding what various DLL calls do

CPU Registers

- General-purpose registers
 - are like scratch space for assembly programmers.
 - On a 32-bit system
 - each register contains 32, 16, or 8 bits of space

CPU Registers

 General-purpose registers





CPU Registers

- Stack and Control Flow Registers
 - store critical information about the stack which is
 - responsible for storing
 - local variables for functions
 - arguments passed into functions
 - and control information relating to the program control flow
 - ESP register points to the top of the stack for the currently executing function
 - EBP register points to the bottom of the stack for the currently executing function
 - EIP register contains the memory address of the currently executing instruction
 - EFLAGS is a status register that contains CPU flags

Arithmetic Instructions

Instructions	Description
add ebx, 100	Adds 100 to the value in EBX and then stores the result in EBX
sub ebx, 100	Subtracts 100 from the value in EBX and then stores the result in EBX
inc ah	Increments the value in AH by 1
dec al	Decrements the value in AL by 1

Data Movement Instructions

Instructions	Description
mov ebx,eax	Moves the value in register EAX into register EBX
mov eax, [0x12345678]	Moves the data at memory address 0x12345678 into the EAX register
mov edx, 1	Moves the value 1 into the register EDX
mov [0x12345678], eax	Moves the value in EAX into the memory location 0x12345678

- Stack Instructions
 - push instruction

push 1

- points the ESP to a new memory address
- copies the value from the argument to that memory location
- pop instruction

рор еах

 pops the top value off the stack and move it into a specified register.

- Stack Instructions
 - It is important to understand that stack grows downward in memory
 - the highest value on the stack is actually stored at the lowest address in stack memory
 - push instruction decrements the ESP and then copies the value into that memory location
 - pop instruction copies the top value off of the stack and then increments the value of ESP

- Control Flow Instructions
 - define a program's control flow
 - often expressed through C-style function calls
 - are closely related to stack
 - the most important are call and ret

- Control Flow Instructions
 - call instruction calls a function
 - Think of it as a function in a higher-level language like C

call address

- does two things
 - First, it pushes the address of the next instruction onto the top of the stack so that
 - Second, it replaces the current value of EIP with the value specified by the address operand.

- Control Flow Instructions
 - the ret instruction completes a function call

ret

- ret pops the top value off the stack
 - places the popped value back into EIP and resumes execution
- The jmp is another important control flow instruction jmp 0x12345678
 - tells the CPU to move to the memory address specified as its parameter

- Control Flow Instructions
 - x86 assembly doesn't have high-level constructs like if, then, else, else if
 - branching to an address typically requires two instructions:
 - a cmp instruction
 - a conditional branch instruction

- Control Flow Instructions
 - Most conditional branch instructions
 - start with a j
 - post-fixed with letters that stand for the condition being tested
 - E.g. jge tells the program to jump if greater than or equal to

- Basic Blocks and Control Flow Graphs
 - A basic block is a sequence of instructions that we know will always execute contiguously
 - always ends with either a branching instruction or an instruction that is the target of a branch
 - always begins with either the first instruction of the program or a branch target

Basic Blocks and Control Flow Graphs

setup: # symbol standing in for address of instruction on the next line

```
• mov eax, 10
```

loopstart: # symbol standing in for address of the instruction on the next line


```
❷ sub eax, 1
```

```
❸ cmp 0, eax
```

```
jne $loopstart
```

loopend: # symbol standing in for address of the instruction on the next line
mov eax, 1

```
# more code would go here
```



Disassembling ircbot.exe

pip install pefile
pip install capstone

 capstone is an open source disassembly library that can disassemble 32-bit x86 binary code

Demo time

static analysis has limitations

- render it less useful in some circumstances
- malware authors can employ certain offensive tactics
 - are far easier to implement than to defend against

- Packing
 - the process by which malware authors compress, encrypt, or mangle the bulk of their malicious program
 - it appears inscrutable to malware analysts
 - When the malware is run, it unpacks itself and then begins execution.
 - The obvious way around packing is
 - To actually run the malware in a safe environment
 - is also used by benign software installers for legitimate reasons

- Resource Obfuscation
 - obfuscates the way program resources are stored on disk, and then deobfuscate them at runtime
 - A simple obfuscation would be
 - to add a value of 1 to all bytes in images and strings stored in the PE resources section
 - subtract 1 from all of this data at runtime
 - one way around resource obfuscation is
 - to run the malware in a safe environment.
 - Another mitigation is to
 - figure out the ways in which malware has obfuscated its resources
 - manually deobfuscate them

- Anti-disassembly Techniques
 - are designed to exploit the inherent limitations of disassembly techniques to
 - hide code from malware analysts
 - or make malware analysts think that a block of code contains different instructions than it actually does
 - there's no perfect way to defend against them
 - In practice, the two main defenses against are
 - to run malware samples in a dynamic environment
 - to manually figure out where anti-disassembly strategies manifest within a malware sample and how to bypass them

- Dynamically Downloaded Data
 - involves externally sourcing data and code
 - a malware may load code dynamically from an external server at malware startup time
 - static analysis will be useless against such code
 - A malware may source decryption keys from external servers at startup time
 - then use these keys to decrypt data or code
 - Such techniques are quite powerful
 - the only way around them is to acquire the code, data, or private keys on the external servers by some means